Source: W. Angress, "The German Jews, 1933 - 1939", in: M. Marrus, (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust , Westport & London, 1989, Vol. 2, pp. 484 - 497.
A week after Hitler's appointment as chancellor, a fixture professor of history, Ernst Simon, wrote from Palestine to his friend and teacher Martin Buber about an article on Zionism he was writing. At the end of the letter was a brief question: Does the Hitler thing [ Hitlerei ] affect you directly? And what's your prognosis?' 1 Buber replied on February 14 from Heppenheim - after a very thorough analysis of Simon's essay - that the "Hitler thing" had so far done nothing to him, although he was prepared for anything. As for a prognosis, he felt that this would depend on the outcome of the anticipated conflicts between the Nationalists and the Nazis within Hitler's coalition government. A shift of the present power constellation in favour of the Nazis, even if they should succeed in further strengthening their parliamentary basis, was unlikely to be granted by the Nationalists, who held an overwhelming majority in the Cabinet. In that case, according to Buber, the Hitler people will either remain in the government, regardless; then they'll be sent into battle against the proletariat, which will split their party and will render them harmless. Or they'll quit [the government]; then there will be presumably a state of siege in which . . . the technical superiority of the army vis-a-vis the . . . [Nazis] will undoubtedly win the upper hand. As long as the present coalition prevails, any real persecution of Jews [Judenhetze] or anti-Jewish legislation is unthinkable. . . . Buber added that administrative nastiness could be expected, but legislation against Jews would only become possible - the present power constellation in the government should shift in favour of the Nazis, which seemed unlikely. Open persecution of the Jews would merely occur between the time the Nazis quit the government, and the proclamation of a stage of siege 2 .
Buber's prognosis proved to be wrong, of course, but he was by no means alone in misjudging the situation. Like the majority of the nation, most German Jews - there were five hundred and thirty thousand of them in January 1933 3 - underestimated Hitler's skill in political manoeuvring, and few believed that his regime would last long or that, if it did, any far-reaching anti-Jewish measures would materialise. Such optimism rapidly evaporated within a few weeks after the so-called seizure of power, although the real extent of the dangers faced by the Jews remained obscured by what one historian recently termed "creeping persecution." 4 As the party had failed beforehand to devise any definite policy on how to solve the "Jewish Question" once in power, its efforts to eliminate the Jews from all spheres of national life gradually proceeded from 1933 to the end of 1938 without a recognisable pattern of co-ordination 5 . Thus during the first five years of the Third Reich, both the Party and the rapidly Nazified bureaucracy operated on the hazy assumption that some solution would have to be found to rid Germany of her Jews as quickly as possible. But how this was to be accomplished remained for years subject to improvisation. Nevertheless, during the first six months of 1933, when Hitler consolidated his power and elbowed his Nationalist coalition partners into political limbo, the first drastic anti-Jewish measures were taken. Following Boycott Day on April 1, which was staged as a protest against what the Nazis termed "atrocity propaganda" fostered abroad by "international Jewry," decrees were passed which led to the dismissal of Jews from the civil service, and shortly thereafter from the courts and the public health service 6 . These measures were accompanied throughout the Reich by what Party officials fondly called "spontaneous outbursts of the outraged public against Jewish impudence and arrogance," a euphemism for "hooliganism," usually organised by stormtroopers against individual Jews, their houses of worship, their cemeteries, and their places of business. Over the next few years, Jews were driven from the schools and universities - both teachers and students - and ultimately from Germany's economy 7 .
Given these developments, it soon became obvious that some sort of leadership would have to be provided within German Jewry in order to present its collective concerns to the regime, render counsel and assistance to those who were losing their livelihood, and, as far as this was possible under the circumstances, chart a course for the immediate future in an attempt to respond to the deteriorating situation of the Jews. Not surprisingly, this task fell to men and women of the educated Jewish elite.
Who belonged to this elite? Though any answer is bound to be somewhat arbitrary, we may include first of all members of the professions, all of which required a firm educational basis, usually with university training. This category included the medical and legal professions, educators on all levels, scientists, engineers, rabbis, etc. To these must be added persons from cultural and artistic life, i. e., writers, publishers, journalists, theatre directors, actors, painters, and musicians. Finally, a good number of Jewish businessmen, notably bankers, industrialists, and prominent merchants, tended to be well educated, had attended either six or nine years of secondary schools, and not infrequently held a university degree, usually a doctor of law or philosophy. A rough estimate of their number in 1933 would be thirty thousand 8 .
It was precisely this category of Jews - for convenience's sake I shall call them intellectuals - that suffered the first massive dismissals as a result of anti-Jewish legislation passed in April 1933. Deprived of their livelihood as civil servants, state attorneys, judges, teachers, and professors, a relatively large number of them-the exact number is difficult to determine - emigrated during the first year of Hitler's chancellorship. They were joined by Jews not in government employment, whose livelihood and safety were also threatened: writers, journalists, entertainers, and lea-ruing politicians. A few wealthy business people who viewed the future with misgivings also decided to leave the country while "the going was good." 9 Although more Jews, including many educated people, emigrated in 1933 than in any other year prior to 1938-39, many educated Jews remained 10 . They assumed positions of leadership on the national and local levels and attempted to help German Jewry adjust to the drastic changes that had occurred since Hitler had become Chancellor. Few of them realised at the time that more than readjustment was involved, and that they would, in fact, be called upon to preside over the break-up of the Jewish community in Germany.
Their task was formidable from the outset. Attempts had to be made to establish contact with the new regime in order to ascertain what National Socialism held in store for the Jews, and what role, if any, the Jewish leadership would be allowed to play in what they initially assumed would be a process of readjustment. As already mentioned, nothing was known in 1933 about any definite policy the regime may have had in connection with the so-called solution of the Jewish Question. This was not surprising because, as we now know, no such policy existed at the time.
Aside from establishing some working agreement with the regime, several major areas affecting the Jews demanded the attention of their leadership. All those dismissed from the civil service, the legal profession, and all subsequent victims of Gleichschaltung ( aryanization or nazification), which since April 1933 had affected Jews in most areas of public life, had to be retrained either to enable them to find a new livelihood in Germany, or to prepare them for emigration. Both retraining and emigration, initially thought to be essential primarily for the young generation, had to be organised. People unable to find jobs because of the process of Gleichschaltung, and those either too old or too sick to be retrain, had to be supported by the Jewish community which had to raise the necessary funds from among its own members since Jews were no longer eligible for state aid. Finally, the educational, cultural, and spiritual needs of the Jews had to be met in the face of their rapid and relentless isolation within society 11 .
All these tasks required unity and co-operation which, in the approximately one hundred years since emancipation, had always been a weak point with Germany's Jews. Divided among different religious traditions - Orthodox, Conservative (in Germany, Liberal), and Reform - and since the turn of the century also into assimilationists and Zionists (to name but the most obvious divisions), they had never succeeded in creating an all-encompassing organisation that could represent and speak for the Jewish community as a whole 12 . When Hitler took office, the bulk of German Jewry was organised - often with overlapping membership - in the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens (Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith), or CV, and the Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten (Union of Jewish Front Veterans), or RjF. Both were decidedly non-Zionist. The Zionists, who were until 1933 a very small minority, had their Zionistische Vereinigung fuer Deutschland (German Zionist Federation). The various Jewish congregations were loosely organized in the German-Israelite Congregational League. In addition, there existed two small but vociferous organisations of super-patriots, the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden (League of National-German Jews) and Deutscher Vortrupp (German Vanguard). I shall say more about these later on 13 .
It was not until September 1933 that an umbrella organisation, the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden (National Representation of German Jews), was established. Representing all Jewish religious and secular factions, this organisation grew out of a less comprehensive Reichsvertretung der juedischen Landesverbaende (Reich Representation of Jewish Regional Associations) founded in 1932 14 . Reichsvertretung and CV were run by men and women of the educated elite, both at the main offices in Berlin and in the regional branches. The Reichsvertretung was jointly directed by Dr. Otto Hirsch 15 , formerly an official in Wuerttemberg's Ministry of the Interior, and by Rabbi Dr. Leo Baeck 16 . Most of the other members of the board also had the title of doctor, a trademark of German Jewry's upper crust. It was similar in the CV, whose board consisted almost entirely of lawyers, and whose newspaper, the C.V Zeitung, was edited by Dr. Alfred Hirschberg and Drs. Hans and Eva Reichmann. Many of those who assumed the burden of leadership responded to the formidable challenge they faced partly from a feeling of noblesse oblige, and partly because they had been ousted from their jobs in the civil service, the press, the law courts, or non-Jewish private enterprise. Left with few choices, they had flocked into the exclusively - and constantly shrinking - Jewish sector where they joined forces with rabbis and a score of prominent business people who had traditionally volunteered their services to the boards of congregations or regional CV and Zionist chapters 17 .
During the first two and a half years of the Third Reich, until the passage of the Nuremberg racial laws in September 1935, spokesmen for the principal Jewish organisations as well as the Jewish press took a somewhat precarious dual approach in dealing with the Nazis. While registering their protests against anti-Semitic insults by Party newspapers and speakers, they simultaneously assured the regime of German Jewry's unquestioned loyalty to the fatherland 18 . The objective was to reach some sort of acceptable accommodation with the new rulers. Thus shortly after the April 1 Boycott Day, and after the subsequent passage of legislation ousting Jews from the civil service, the C.V Zeitung, the most widely circulated assimilationist newspaper, responded to the recent events by stating that Jews no longer enjoyed equal rights with the rest of the nation. The ideology of Aryan racial superiority and the imputed unsuitability of Jews for state service was now law, and although the Jews disagreed, they would have to bow to the facts. Yet despite these developments, the paper stated, Germany remained their homeland, and it is our objective to maintain the German-Jewish community in Germany materially, physically, and spiritually unbroken in its strength.' 19 Shortly before Boycott Day, assimilationist and Zionist spokesmen had voiced their dismay at the upcoming boycott to the government. The Nazis justified the boycott as a defence against the lively press campaign abroad which charged Hitler's regime with unrestrained violations of Jewish rights. This "atrocity propaganda," as they chose to call it, the Nazis attributed to the "machinations of international Jewry." In view of this situation, the Jewish spokesmen accompanied their protests with emphatic assurances that Germany's Jews strongly disapproved of, and disassociated themselves from, the anti-German agitation abroad 20 . It was a bizarre situation. Inside Germany, leading representatives of the Jewish community, which had been exposed to countless indignities and sporadic physical outrages ever since January 30, now found themselves compelled, for reasons of political prudence, to disavow the accuracy of the charges raised abroad, although they knew only too well how true many of them were. Worse yet, the charges did not only appear in the major newspapers of neighbouring countries but also in detailed and well informed accounts published in German-language emigre journals then springing up in Paris, Prague, Amsterdam, and elsewhere. Their contributors and editors were mostly Jewish intellectuals who had led Germany with the first wave of refugees in the spring and summer of 1933. They may have meant well, these knights of the pen, but their good intentions were viewed with mixed feelings by the embattled Jews still residing along the banks of the rivers Rhine, Spree, Elbe, and Main rather than along those of the Moldau, Amstel, Thames, or Seine.
Since 1933, responsible representatives of the Jews, notably the Reichsvertretung, tried with considerable tact and restraint (and, one might add, with diminishing success) to protect the Jewish community at least from unauthorised violations of their rights while attempting simultaneously to discover, equally unsuccessfully, what place, if any, within German society the regime would allot the Jews. A less balanced approach toward seeking an accommodation with the Third Reich was taken by a few men who headed organisations with a pronounced German-patriotic stance. There was, first of all, Dr. Leo Loewenstein, a scientist by profession, a captain in the Bavarian Army Reserve, retired, and chairman of the Union of Jewish Front Veterans (RjF.) 21 . For over two years he tried to persuade Hitler by mail to allow patriotic Jews, and the young generation in particular, to be absorbed into the German Volksgemeinschaft; settle as farmers on German soil; participate in athletic contests with non-Jewish youth; and, alter the announcement of German remilitarization in March 1935, to serve in the German armed forces. Hitler never replied, and none of these requests was ever granted 22 . However, Loewenstein did succeed in April 1933, through an appeal to the aged President von Hindenburg, in having Jewish civil servants with frontline service during wartime exempted from losing their jobs. It proved a dubious achievement because it created two classes of Jews, privileged and non-privileged. Moreover, the exemptions were honoured only until Hindenburg's death in August 1934 23 .
While Loewenstein rushed a lot of Jewish feathers, Dr. Max Naumann, a lawyer and chairman of the League of National-German Jews, succeeded in offending most of his co-religionists by his even crasser attempts to curry favour with the regime. He and his supporters, for the most part respectable members of the professions, publicly de-emphasised theJewishness while stressing their German heritage. They also drew a clear line between themselves and those of their fellow Jews whom they disdainfully labelled Cosmopolitans, Leftists, Zionists, and Eastern Jews. All those falling within these categories were not worthy of being called Germans, according to Naumann, whereas his group was, and therefore should not be subjected to discriminatory racial laws 24 . Less offensive but equally nationalistic was the attitude of the Deutscher Vortrupp (German Vanguard) led by Dr. Hans-Joachim Schoeps, a brilliant albeit eccentric young theologian 25 . Unlike Naumann's group, Schoeps and his disciples were avowed Jews but also fiercely nationalistic, and they tried hard to sell this ideological blend to an utterly unreceptive regime. Both organisations were ordered dissolved by the end of 1935, while the Union of Jewish Front Veterans (RjF) survived until the end of 1938. I chose these selected examples to show how far some Jewish leaders were prepared to go to achieve possible accommodation with the regime. Needless to say, they all failed; but so did the more judicious efforts of the Reichsvertretung and the CV in trying to obtain assurances from the government that at least those Jews unwilling or unable to leave would be allowed to stay in Germany.
References:
1. Martin Buber, Briefwechsel aus sieben Jahrzehnten , vol. 2 (Heidelberg, 1973), p. 463.
2. Ibid., pp. 465ΓÇô67.
3. These figures are rough approximations and pertain only to Jews who listed themselves as Glaubensjuden , i.e., Jews who professed their faith. The 1925 census recorded 564,379 Glaubensjuden in Germany; by June 1933, six months after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, the census established a figure of 499,682 Glaubensjuden . See Esra Bennathan, 'Die demographische und wirtschaftliche Struktur der Juden,' in Werner E. Mosse and Arnold Paucker, eds., Entscheidungsjahr 1932. Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik . Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts, 13 (Tuebingen, 1965), pp. 87ΓÇô88. The figure 530,000 in January 1933 - again a rough estimate - is based on compilations from the following studies: Werner Rosenstock, 'Exodus 1933ΓÇô1939. A Survey of Jewish Emigration from Germany,' in Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute , vol. I (1956), pp. 373ΓÇô90 (hereafter cited as LBI Year Book ); Wilhelm Treue, 'Die Juden in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Rheinischen Raumes 1648ΓÇô1945,' in Monumenta Judaica (Cologne, 1964), pp. 458ΓÇô59; Helmut Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich (Goettingen-Berlin-Frankfurt-Zuerich, 1966), pp. 274, 291; and Bennathan, passim .
4. Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden , p. 4.
5. This is evident from the findings of Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy Toward German Jews 1933ΓÇô1939 (Urbana-Chicago-London, 1970) and Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Duesseldorf, 1972). See also Hans Mommsen, 'Der nationalsozialistische Polizeistaat und die Judenverfolgung vor 1938: Dokumentation,' Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte , X (1962), 76. But cf. the older account in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, Gerhard Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. Studien zur Errichtung des totalitaeren Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933ΓÇô34 (Cologne and Opladen, 1960), p. 277. On the genesis of anti-Jewish legislation predating the 'seizure of power' see ibid., p. 411ΓÇô13, and Saul Esh, 'Designs for Anti-Jewish Policy in Germany up to the Nazi Rule,' Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance , VI (1967), 83ΓÇô120, esp. 115ΓÇô20 (hereafter cited as YVS ).
6. Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung , pp. 278ΓÇô79; Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz , pp. 62ΓÇô91; Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden , pp. 43ΓÇô59.
7. Adam, Judenpolitik , pp. 51ΓÇô71, and passim ; Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz , pp. 95ΓÇô114, and passim: Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung , pp. 277ΓÇô86, 496ΓÇô503; Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich. Mit ausgewaehlten Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Beamtenpolitik. Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte , XIII (Stuttgart, 1966), 48ΓÇô60.
8. This estimate is based on Bennathan, in Entscheidungsjahr 1932 , pp. 111ΓÇô12, and Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden , p. 287.
9. Rosenstock, in LBI Year Book I (1956), pp. 377-80, esp. p. 378; Schleunes, The Twisted Road , p. 199; Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden , p. 291.
10.Rosenstock, in LBI Year Book I (1956), pp. 373ΓÇô74, 377; Genschel, Verdraengung , p. 291.
11.Friedrich S. Brodnitz, 'Die Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden,' in Hans Tramer, ed., In zwei Welten. Siegfried Moses zum 75. Geburtstag (Tel Aviv, 1962), pp. 106ΓÇô13.
12.Marjorie Lamberti, 'The Attempt to Form a Jewish Block: Jewish Notables and Politics in Wilhelminian Germany,' Central European History , III (1970), 73.
13.Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung , p. 262. On the origins of the CV see Ismar Schorsch, Jewish Reactions to German Antisemitism 1870ΓÇô1914 (New York-London, 1972), pp. 117ΓÇô48, and Arnold Paucker, 'Zur Problematik einer juedischen Abwehrstrategie in der deutschen Gesellschaft,' in Werner E. Mosse and Arnold Paucker, eds., Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890ΓÇô1914 . Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts, 33 (Tuebingen, 1976), pp. 480ΓÇô548. On the RjF see Ulrich Dunker, Der Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten 1919ΓÇô1938. Geschichte eines juedischen Abwehrvereins (Duesseldorf, 1977); Ruth Pie, 'Embattled Veterans: The Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten,' LBI Year Book XIX (1974), pp. 139ΓÇô54. On the RjF, and also on th Verband nationaldeutscher Juden and the Deutscher Vortrupp , Gefolgschaft deutscher Juden ,' unpubl. Ph.D. Diss., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1978, passim . On the origins of the Zionistische Vereinigung see Jehuda Reinharz, Fatherland or Promised Land. The Dilemma of the German Jew , 1893ΓÇô1914 (Ann Arbor, 1975), pp. 90ΓÇô143, and passim .
14.Brodnitz, in In zwei Welten , pp. 106ΓÇô13; Hugo Hahn, 'Die Gruendung der Reichsvertretung,' ibid., pp. 97ΓÇô105; Franz Meyer, 'Bemerkungen zu den zwei Denkschriften,'' ibid., pp. 114ΓÇô18, and 'Zwei Denkschriften,' ibid., pp. 120ΓÇô27; Max Gruenewald, 'Der Anfang der Reichsvertretung,' in Robert Welsch, ed., Deutsches Judentum, Aufstieg und Krise. Gestalten, Ideen, Werke (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 315ΓÇô25; Hans-Erich Fabian, 'Zur Entstehung der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland,'' in Herbert A. Strauss and Kurt Grossmann, eds., Gegenwart im Rueckblick. Festgabe fuer die juedische Gemeinde zu Berlin 25 Jahre nach dem Neubeginn (Heidelberg, 1970), pp. 165ΓÇô68. For two rather critical Zionist views of the Reichsvertretung , see Kurt Jakob Ball-Kaduri, 'The National Representation of Jews in GermanyΓÇôObstacles and Accomplishments at its Establishment,' YVS , II (1975 [1958]), 159ΓÇô78, and Abraham Margaliot, 'The Dispute Over the Leadership of German Jewry (1933ΓÇô1938),' ibid., X (1974), 129ΓÇô48.
15.For a brief sketch of Hirsch's life, see Leo Baeck, 'Gedenken an zwei Tote,' in Deutsches Judentum , pp. 312ΓÇô13, and Ernst G. Lowenthal, ed., Bewaehrung im Untergang. Ein Gedenkbuch (Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 71ΓÇô74. See also Annedore Leber, Das Gewissen entscheidet: Bereiche des deutschen Widerstandes von 1933ΓÇô1945, in Lebensbildern (Berlin-Frankfurt/Main, 1957), pp. 12ΓÇô17.
16.The literature on Leo Baeck is growing steadily. Here it will suffice to list some of the earliest and some of the latest publications. The former consist of several short sketches by Siegfried Moses, Hans Liebeschuetz, Eva Reichmann, and Wolfgang Hamburger, under the heading: 'In Memorium Leo Baeck,' LBI Year Book II (1957), pp. 3ΓÇô34; among the latter is Leonard Baker, Days of Sorrow and Faith. Leo Baeck and the Berlin Jews (New York, 1978). For a rather polemical exchange on Baeck's image, see Ball-Kaduri, 'Leo Baeck and Contemporary History. A Riddle in Leo Baeck's Life,' YVS , VI (1967), 121ΓÇô29; and Ernst Simon, 'Comments on the Article on the late Rabbi Baeck,' ibid., pp. 131ΓÇô34.
17.Brodnitz, in In zwei Welten , p. 111. In Bewaehrung im Untergang . Lowenthal, in his series of brief biographies, presents 178 men and women who served the Jewish community in Germany either in Berlin or on the congregational level in the provinces, and who perished in the Final Solution. Of these, 50 were rabbis, 46 jurists, 24 educators on all levels, 15 businessmen, 8 physicians, and the remainder former public officials, journalists, architects, or full-time employees of Jewish congregations. Lowenthal makes it clear in the introduction that this is by no means a complete list but merely a 'representative' one as he was unable to secure the names and data of everybody who served in a similar capacity, and perished.
18.Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Machtergreifung , pp. 282ΓÇô83; Brodnitz, in In zwei Welten , p. 108; see also the two 'Denkschriften,' ibid., pp. 120ΓÇô27, and Gruenewald, in Deutsches Judentum , p. 320. For a succinct survey of this reaction as it affected the various Jewish organisations, regardless of religious or ideological orientation, see Dunker, Reichsbung juedischer Frontsoldaten , pp. 115ΓÇô24.
19. C.V Zeitung , XII, 15 (April 13, 1933).
20.See, for example, the appeal by the (old) Reichsvertretung in conjunction with the Executive of the Berlin Jewish Congregation to Hitler, dated March 29, 1933, in Klaus J. Hermann, Das Dritte Reich und die deutsch-juedischen Organisationen 1933ΓÇô1934. Schriftenreihe der Hochschule fuer Politische Wissenschaften Muenchen, Neue Folge, 4 (Cologne-Berlin-Bonn-Munich, 1969), p. 61. See also Dunker, Reichsbund , pp. 121ΓÇô22 (for the CV); Jakow Trachtenberg, Die Greuelpropaganda ist eine Luegenpropaganda, sagen die deutschen Juden selbst (Berlin, 1933).
21.On Loewenstein, see Rheins, unpubl. Diss., pp. 21, 207, and passim ; Hermann, Das Dritte Reich , p. 18.
22.Dunker, Reichsbund , pp. 132ΓÇô44, 173ΓÇô75; Hermann, Das Dritte Reich , pp. 18ΓÇô21, 49ΓÇô52, 66ΓÇô67, 69, 92ΓÇô105, 119ΓÇô23, 126ΓÇô27, 132ΓÇô42; Rheins, pp. 177ΓÇô79.
23.Dunker, Reichsbund , pp. 132ΓÇô44; Schleunes, The Twisted Road , pp. 95ΓÇô96, 104ΓÇô5; Mommsen, Beamtentum , pp. 48, 54, 59; Adam, Judenpolitik , p. 64; Gruenewald, in Deutsches Judentum , p. 320.
24.On Naumann and the VndJ see Rheins, pp. 58ΓÇô101; Hermann, pp. 12ΓÇô13, 21ΓÇô31, and passim .
25.Rheins, pp. 147ΓÇô90, and the following autobiographical books by Hans-Joachim Schoeps: Die letzten dreissig Jahre: Rueckblicke (Stuttgart, 1956); JaΓÇôNeinΓÇôund Trotzdem. ErinnerungenΓÇôBegegnungenΓÇôErfahrungen (Mainz, 1974); and the documentation, 'Bereit fuer Deutschland.' Der Patriotismus deutscher Juden und der Nationalsozialismus. Fruehe Schriften 1930ΓÇô1939. (Berlin, 1970).
